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We revisit the notion of technological trajectories by means of a detailed case-study of the 
evolution of tank technology between 1915 and 1945. We use principal component analysis to 
analyze the distribution of technological characteristics and how they map into specific service 
characteristics. We find that, despite the existence of differences in technical leadership, tank 
designs of different countries show a high degree of overlap and closeness along a common 
technological trajectory. In the conclusions, we speculate on whether this pattern can be 
explained by common heuristics that influenced the rate and direction of design activities or by 
doctrinal viewpoints influencing the development and use of tanks on the battlefield.  












An earlier draft of this paper has been presented at the fourth European Meeting on Applied Evolutionary 
Economics (EMAEE), Utrecht, May, 2005. We thank the participants at the meeting for helpful 
comments. In particular, the paper has benefited from the suggestions of Jerry Silverberg, Marco Valente, 
Werner Holzl. We also thank Giovanni Dosi  and Bart Verspagen for encouraging words and useful 
discussions. Usual disclaimers apply. 
 
* GGDC, University of Groningen, PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands; Phone: (+) 31 50 
363 3777; Fax: (+) 31 50 363 7337; Email: c.castaldi@rug.nl
 
** Department of Economics, University of Pavia, Via San Felice 5, 27100, Pavia (Italy) and CESPRI, 
Bocconi University, Via Sarfatti 25, 20139, Milan (Italy); Phone: (+) 39 02 58363037; Fax: (+) 39 02 
58363399; Email: roberto.fontana@unibocconi.it
 
*** Eindhoven Centre for Innovation Studies (ECIS), Eindhoven University of Technology, PO Box 513, 
5600 MB, Eindhoven, The Netherlands; Phone: (+) 31 40 2474179; Fax: (+) 31 40 2474646; Email: 
a.nuvolari@tm.tue.nl
 1. Introduction 
The notions of technological paradigms and technological trajectories have exerted a 
wide appeal among economists and other social scientists working in the field of 
innovation studies. Since the seminal contributions by Dosi (1982, 1988),
1 several authors 
have devoted substantial efforts to provide detailed empirical analyses of the process of 
technical change employing this framework (see, amongst others, Sahal, 1985 and 
Saviotti, 1996). Besides these authors however, most of the literature has adopted the 
notions of paradigms and trajectories in a rather loose way, mainly as metaphors 
featuring in broad (‘appreciative’) reconstructions of the patterns of technological 
evolution. 
 
The main aim of this paper is to re-visit the original potentialities of Dosi’s framework in 
a detailed case-study of the evolution of a specific technology. In particular, we present 
an historical study of the evolution of tanks for the period 1915-1945. Tanks represent 
one of the major innovations in military technology introduced in the first half of the 
twentieth century and the history of their development presents several points of interest 
in its own right (Hacker, 2005). However, we contend that from our case study one 
could also draw broader implications with general bearings for the innovation studies 
literature. The tank - at least in the period we consider - constituted a complex 
engineering product aimed at achieving certain performance results (in most general 
terms: mobility, firepower and protection). The task of tank designers was to search for 
technical solutions that translated into acceptable performance levels. In the case of tank 
technology, the relationship between the configuration of the various technical 
characteristics of the tank (road speed, armour, armament calibre, etc.) and the 
performance attributes is relatively straightforward. However, the existence of 
interdependencies among technical characteristics produced a number of trade-offs 
between performance attributes. In order to develop ‘good’ designs, engineers had to 
search for ‘satisfying’ solutions. Hence, the particularly clear-cut nature of the 
engineering trade-offs characteristics of this technology provides an ideal starting point 
for the study of the technological trajectories and of the underlying search processes. 
Secondly, in the period considered, for obvious strategic motives, all the major 
industrialized countries were engaged in the development of tanks. In this early phase, as 
stressed by the received historical accounts of the evolution of tank technology (Murray, 
                                                 
1 An earlier formulation of the idea of 'technological paradigm' was put forward by Constant (1973).  
 21996), it was not at all clear what would have been the most effective way of employing 
tanks on the battlefield. Different countries held drastically different viewpoints on this 
topical issue. In the 1920s and 1930s, military establishments in France, UK and USA 
tended to regard the tank simply as a “gun with a certain degree mobility” to be 
primarily employed for infantry support. In Germany, mainly due to the influence of 
Heinz Guderian (Guderian, 1999), tanks were instead considered as the backbone of 
new tactics based on speed and mobility. Therefore, it will be of particular interest to 
examine to what extent the debate among these different doctrinal viewpoints 
influenced the rate and direction of design activities. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the major theoretical and 
empirical issues related with both the identification and the mapping of technological 
trajectories. Section 3 presents our data-set and provides a short historical account of the 
main trends in the evolution of tank technology. In section 4, following Saviotti and 
Trickett (1992), we use principal component analysis to study the distributions of 
technological characteristics of the tank models contained in our data-set  We employ 
Standard Deviational Ellipses technique to map the evolution of tank trajectory. In 
Section 5 we discuss the main findings of our exercise and conclude.  
 
1.  Background literature 
As it is well known, Dosi (1982, 1988) proposed what may be called a 
paradigm/trajectory approach to the study of technical change. Dosi defines a 
technological paradigm as: “model and a pattern of solution of selected  technological 
problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected material 
technologies” (Dosi, 1982: 152, italics in the text). The term paradigm is clearly borrowed 
from Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science. In the case of technologies, the concept of 
paradigm refers to a framework, jointly adhered by a significant group of innovators, 
guiding the search for technical advances in particular historical contexts. In this way, a 
technological paradigm defines the boundaries of the domain in which future 
technological developments will take place. Dosi suggests that it should be possible to 
deconstruct each technological paradigm in a set of “heuristics”. These represent the 
prevailing accepted rules prescribing the procedures to be adopted in the search for 
innovations (for example: “in order to develop a more efficient steam engine, try to 
increase the rate of expansion”). It is interesting to note that the notions of technological 
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engineering prescriptions. In Dosi’s view, technological heuristics are the product of the 
“amalgamation” of what might be termed the “autonomous drift” of a technology (i.e. 
the “compulsive sequences” of challenges and solutions identified by Rosenberg (1976) 
which are insensitive to market signals) with “inducement factors” of a genuine 
economic nature (i.e. current and expected factor prices). This means that local 
circumstances can, to a certain extent, shape the pattern of technological development.  
 
The heuristic search process practised by the inventors’ community generates relatively 
ordered patterns of technical change, called “technological trajectories”, by channelling 
inventive activities into specific and finalised directions. These trajectories can, at least in 
principle, be mapped in both the space of input of coefficients and that of product 
characteristics (Dosi, 1997: 1533).  
 
The paradigm/trajectory view of technological evolution points to three essential 
features of the process of technical change:  
 
i)  the local nature of technical progress: inventive activities are paradigm-bounded 
and, for this reason, they are highly selective and focussed in rather precise directions; 
ii)  along a specific technological trajectory, technical advances are strongly cumulative, 
that is to say, they are strongly related to previous attainments;  
iii)  technological development is likely to display strong irreversibility. This means that 
techniques developed along particular trajectories are likely to become superior to old 
ones at every relative factor price level. As a consequence, once the movement along a 
particular technological trajectory has gained momentum, it becomes relatively 
irresponsive to changes in input prices.  
 
One of the appealing features of the paradigm/trajectory view was that it could provide a 
theoretical explanation for a number of empirical findings (mostly going under the 
heading of ‘technological forecasting’ ) that since the late 1970s and early 1980s had 
introduced and developed quantitative indicators to describe the evolution of 
technologies.
2 These studies revealed that the evolution of technologies was characterized 
                                                 
2 For good overviews of the achievements of this literature, see Sahal (1981), which contains a collection of 
essays published during the late 1970s, Saviotti (1988), and the special issue of Technological Forecasting and 
Social Change (1985, 27, 2-3).  
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they could be mapped. Furthermore, these patterns were also punctuated by 
discontinuities and ruptures that could be linked to historical episodes of paradigm 
change. As Dosi puts it:  
 
“[T]here is no a priori economic reason why one should observe limited clusters of technological 
characteristics at one time and ordered trajectories over time. Indeed, given consumers with different 
preferences and equipment users with different technical requirements, if technology had the malleable 
attributes of information and if innovative search were a purely random search process, one would tend to 
observe sorts of  “technological indifference curves”  at any one time and, over time, random search all 
over the n-dimension characteristic space….[Rather,] the evidence surveyed suggests that one still observes 
“explorations” limited to some, smaller subsets of the notional characteristics space. It is precisely the 
paradigmatic cumulative nature of technological knowledge that accounts for the relatively ordered nature 
of the observed patterns of technological change.” (Dosi, 1988: 1129)  
 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, precisely when the times seemed ripe for establishing 
an intriguing link between theoretical developments and empirical evidence, research 
efforts aimed at producing a detailed quantitative mapping of the long term evolution of 
technologies began to peter out. At the same time, since the late 1980s, growing concerns 
for providing ‘contextualized’ interpretations of technological evolution rendered also the 
field of the history of technology impermeable to exercises in measurement and 
quantification. 
 
One major exception is the stream of literature initiated by Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984).  
Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) built an explicit link between the construction of 
technological output indicators and the concept of technological trajectories. In their 
representation of technology, they draw an important distinction between ‘technical’ or 
design related characteristics and ‘service’ characteristics. Technical characteristics 
represent the internal structure of the artefact and, in most cases, are the dimensions that 
designers take into consideration (for example, in the case of the car, type of engine, type 
of suspensions, weight, etc). Service characteristics, instead, are the ‘services’ actually 
delivered by the artefact in which users are interested (in the case of the car, speed, 
reliability, comfort, etc.). Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) note that, in general there is no 
one-to-one mapping between technical and service characteristics. Rather, in most 
artefacts one technical characteristic will typically affect several service characteristics 
through a complex pattern of correspondence. 
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This conceptual framework has obvious implications for the mapping of technological 
trajectories. Indeed, one has to be well aware whether observable modifications in the 
artefact result from changes in the design space, service space or in transformations in 
the pattern of mapping between the two (Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984: 144-148).  
However, to date, there have been scarce attempts to analyse the evolution of individual 
technologies using this framework, namely Saviotti and Trickett (1992) for helicopters, 
Frenken et al. (2000) for aircrafts, Frenken and Nuvolari (2004) for steam engines, and 
Frenken (2005) for microcomputers and laptops.  
 
This paper expands on this research tradition. Its aim is twofold. First, it provides a new 
case study of a technology within the Saviotti and Metcalfe framework. Second, relying 
on the distinction between service and technical characteristics, it aims at assessing the 
driving factors underlying the dynamics of technological trajectories. In particular, our 
purpose is to disentangle the role of what may be called “technological imperatives” 
stemming from the nature of the internal structure of the artefact, as distinguished from 
the influence of various contextual factors.  
 
3.  The development of tank technology: a short historical overview 
This section takes a first glance at the development of tank technology. First we present 
our data source. Then we give a short account of the main technological events that 
characterized the history of tank technology in the period in question. Both sections 
provide the preliminary background for the analysis that follows.   
 
3.1 The Data  
Our main source of information for the analysis presented in this paper is a dataset of 
262 tank models manufactured between 1915 and 1945. This dataset has been 
constructed on the basis of the information contained in Hogg (2000) a directory of all 
tanks ever built between 1915 and 1999. We consider a sample of five major 
industrialized countries: France, Germany, URSS, UK and USA. For each model, the 
dataset reports information on several technical characteristics of tanks such as, width, 
hull length, height, weight, armour thickness, road speed and range, armament calibre as 
well as year of production and the manufacturer(s). Additional information on quantity 
produced and the period of service of each tank model has been collected from various 
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sample. The number of designs experienced a sharp rise towards the end of World War I 
(WWI), a decrease in the years that immediately followed the end of the conflict and a 
steady increase from 1923 onwards as a consequence of the proliferation of models that 
characterised the race toward rearmament.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 approximately here] 
 
In Table 1 below, the number of tank models is broken down by country and time 
periods.  
 
[Insert Table 1 approximately here] 
 
It can be noted that, against an overall pattern of increase, various countries behaved 
differently. The UK is the country with the highest number of models manufactured, 
followed by the USA and Germany. UK, France and USA are the leaders during WWI 
while the USSR did not manufacture any tank until the 1920s. Between 1920 and 1930 
Germany introduced only one tank, a prototype that never went into full production. 
This was a consequence of the ban on army production imposed by the Versailles Treaty 
that delayed the diffusion of this new weapon in the country. This delay notwithstanding, 
Germany caught up very rapidly during the 1930s with the highest number of tank 
models among the countries in our sample. Model proliferation continued between 1940 
and 1945 for all countries with the obvious exception of occupied France.   
 
3.2 Milestones in the evolution of tank technology 
Although the idea of armoured fighting vehicles had been circulating for long time (one 
could actually trace the concept to the horse drawn chariots launching spears and arrows 
that were employed in the Near East as far back as 2000 BC), it was only during WWI 
that the three key mechanical constituents of the tank: bullet proof armour, internal 
combustion engine and caterpillar tracks, were available. Their combination turned out to 
be crucial for breaking the circumstances of the deadlocked trench warfare of attrition on 
the western front. Accordingly, the date of birth of tank technology can be put in 1917 
when tanks were first employed on the battlefield in sizable numbers although early 
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3 Figures 2 (A, B, C) illustrate the development of 
the technology by charting the progress over time in the three fundamental technical 
characteristics: armament calibre, armour thickness and road speed. The figures show the 
models that can be considered as ‘milestones’ with labelled markers (markers without 
labels represent other noteworthy designs, although of somewhat minor historical 
significance). The figures also contain a time trend line which is computed using all the 
models contained in the dataset.  
 
[Insert Figures 2 (A, B, C) approximately here] 
 
The history of our technology can be usefully sub-divided in the 4 main periods: WWI 
(1915-1920), the 1920s (1921-1930), the 1930s (1931-1939) and WWII (1940-1945).  
 
Tanks produced during WWI were characterized by a rather low degree of mobility (the 
maximum road speed was less than 10 km/h and range was fairly limited). The minimum 
requirement for the armour was obviously to provide protection against machine-gun 
fire, whereas fire power capabilities were ensured by fitting into the vehicle guns of 
calibre comprised between 20 and 40 mm (the two most representative models, in this 
respect may be considered the British ‘Mother’ with its typical rhomboidal shape and the 
French Renault FT-17, which was the first tank with a rotating turret). During the war, 
these types of tanks proved capable of successfully piercing enemy’s trenches. However, 
low speed prevented them from achieving deep breakthroughs beyond enemy lines. In 
this first period there were also experimental attempts of mounting heavy guns on tanks. 
This was done in the French Char 2C mounting a 75 mm gun and in the German K-
Wagen mounting 77 mm guns. Interestingly enough, such heavy guns will be fitted again 
into tanks only from the late 1930s. In fact, the sheer weight of these machines greatly 
limited their effectiveness. In the end, only 10 Char 2C and 2 K-Wagen were actually 
built.  
 
Design efforts during the 1920s aimed at solving a number of limitations related to the 
general operability (not least the extreme crew discomfort of WWI models) and to the 
overall mobility of the machine. Accordingly, in this period some teething shortcomings 
were solved and the single rotating turret design emerged as the most effective solution. 
                                                 
3 This short historical overview of the evolution of tank design draws heavily upon Ogorkiewicz (1991).  
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noteworthy tank of this period was the Vickers 6-ton, which was produced by Vickers as 
a private venture. The tank was not adopted by the British Army, but a very similar 
design (the Vickers medium A6) was employed. However, the development of this tank 
led to a more favourable view of armour warfare in the military establishments of various 
countries (Habeck, 2003). Indeed, the Vickers 6-ton was purchased by several countries 
and its design was copied in Russia providing the basis for the early development of 
Soviet armour.  
    
The 1930s witnessed a growth in the number of designs introduced (obviously linked 
with the rearmament race). The most successful tank of this period was probably the 
Russian BT-5 which employed the independent suspension system invented by the 
American engineer J. W. Christie. It also featured an unprecedented high power/weight 
ratio that provided a major breakthrough in road speed (65 km/h) and mobility. A 47mm 
gun was fitted on the tank. Other tanks representative of this period are the French R-35 
(a ‘light’ tank fitted with a 37 mm gun) and the British Matilda 2. This tank, although 
slow (25 km/h), was endowed with thick armour (78mm) and had a 76mm gun. The 
figures show that many representative tank models introduced during WWII mounted 
similar calibres.    
 
The WWII period was a phase in which design activities had, obviously, to take into 
account the feedback stemming from the relative performance of various models in the 
battlefield. The figures show a number of models with gun calibre around 75mm or 
76mm (the German Panzer 4, the Soviet T-34, the American M-4 Sherman, and the 
British Churchill). In a slightly later phase, we see a clear attempt to fit even higher gun 
calibres (88mm for the German Tiger, 85mm for the Soviet T-34 and 90mm for the 
American M-26, up to the 122mm of the Soviet JS). There is a somewhat wider 
dispersion in armour thickness, although it is evident also in this case that tank models of 
different countries tended to converge towards similar values. This behaviour can be 
plausibly interpreted by the need of matching the battlefield capabilities of enemy 
models. The most successful design of the WWII was the famous Russian T-34, which 
probably represented an almost ideal combination in terms of speed, armour thickness 
and gun calibre. Compared to the Panzer 4, the dominant German tank, the T-34 was 
clearly superior in all three technical characteristics. The appearance of the T-34 
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more powerful guns and thicker armour. However, it is worth noting, that, although 
seemingly qualitatively superior, these tanks were produced in lower numbers. The most 
famous American tank of WWII was the M4-Sherman. Born as an attempt to match the 
calibre of the German Panzer 4, this tank was fitted with a 75mm gun. The M4 did not 
match tanks such as the Tiger and the T-34 in armour thickness. Together with the T-34, 
the M4 is the tank that was produced in largest numbers during WWII.       
    
Representing tanks on the basis of their technical characteristics alone provides just a 
rough sketch of the historical developments in tank designs. Indeed, tanks are not simple 
bundles of technical characteristics. In each design technical characteristics are inter-
related with each other to form what Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) define as the “internal 
structure of the technology”. Furthermore, there is a complex pattern of mapping 
between technical characteristics and service characteristics. This set of interactions is 
likely to present designers with a number of trade-offs. Ultimately, a good design is a 
particularly well chosen compromise between the trade-offs existing in a specific 
technological domain. The aim of the following section is to provide an assessment of 
the linkages between technical characteristics and of the patterns of mapping between 
these and service characteristics. This exercise will provide insights into the search 
process which characterized the historical evolution of tank technology.      
 
4. The empirical analysis  
In this section we move forward in the analysis of the factors affecting the trajectory of 
tank technology. We proceed in two steps. First, we position the case of tanks within the 
framework of analysis based on the distinction between service and design characteristics 
proposed by Saviotti and Metcalfe. Second, we employ principal component analysis to 
study the evolution of tank models over time. 
 
4.1. Conceptualising tank technology  
A tank is a technological system whose design is a compromise between different service 
dimensions which, in turn, are affected by several technical characteristics. Miller (2002: 
6) identifies three main service dimensions: firepower, protection and mobility. 
Firepower and protection refer to the services tanks deliver on the battlefield. They both 
define the ‘battlefield capability’ of the artefact. Tank mobility instead is important in 
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distinguishes between three different kinds of mobility: strategic mobility (i.e. the ability 
of tanks to be moved into the area of operation), operational mobility (i.e. the ability of 
tanks to move in the area of operation) and battlefield mobility (i.e. the ability of tank to 
move when in imminent contact with the target). Each of these services is usually 
influenced by more than one technical characteristic. Figure 3 below provides a 
conceptualisation of the relationship between technical and service characteristics.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 approximately here] 
 
Technical characteristics are listed on the right hand side, while service characteristics are 
summarised on the left hand side. It can be noted that there is no one-to-one mapping 
between the two spaces. To improve one specific service, designers could work on 
several technical characteristics. This is especially true in the case of mobility. For 
instance, strategic mobility involves travelling considerable distances to the fields of 
operation. The ease and speed at which distances can be covered by alternative means of 
transport (rail, ships and/or roads) depends inversely on the weight and size of the tanks 
(the width was particularly influential as long as transport occurred mainly by rail during 
WWI and II). Battlefield mobility instead involves the capability of tanks to move in 
quite different terrains ranging from soft soil to hard ground. To the extent that mobility 
depends on the pressure exerted on the ground, battlefield mobility on soft soil depends 
inversely on weight. Battlefield mobility on hard ground depends instead on how the 
weight of tank is distributed which in turn depends on the type of suspensions 
implemented and on the length of the tank. Suspensions can help reducing ground 
pressure. Increasing the length of the tank can help distributing better its weight on the 
wheels. In both cases, mobility is increased. Finally, operational mobility involves the 
ability of tanks to move under their own power along roads as well as cross country. 
Cross country movement is inversely influenced by the weight of tanks. Heavy tanks are 
generally slower than light ones because they exert higher ground pressure. Road speed, 
range and engine power instead positively affects movement. Range, defined as the 
average distance a tank can cover without requiring any logistic support, seems 
particularly important for operational mobility. The wider the range, the higher the 
freedom of movement becomes.  
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the issues involved in tank design. Indeed, the complexity of tank design is in part due to 
the presence of interdependence among the technical characteristics themselves. To 
improve performance, designers had, and still have today, to engineer around several 
technical trade-offs. Consider mobility for instance. Increasing the length of the tank 
improves operational mobility. However, longer tanks become heavier and less 
manoeuvrable on the battlefield which increases the probability of being hit. In the case 
of operational mobility, range can be increased by reducing the frequency of refuelling 
through an increase in the amount of fuel that can be carried. However, carrying extra 
fuel increases the weight of the tank which further increases the demand of fuel 
especially if tanks are powered by gas turbines instead of more efficient diesel engines. 
Finally, technical trade-offs very often translate into service trade-offs. For instance, 
better battlefield capability (i.e. better protection and greater fire power) achieved 
through an increase in armour thickness and higher armament calibre leads to an increase 
in the weight of the tank and a decrease in road speed. Battlefield capability is improved 
at the expense of mobility if it is not supported by an improvement in another 
characteristic such as engine power for instance.  
 
As argued in Section 3, the evolution of tank technology between 1915 and 1945 was 
characterised by a common heuristics entailing an increase in road speed as well as in 
armour thickness and calibre. Evidence on the major trade-offs between technical 
characteristics that accompanied the evolution of tanks is presented in Table 2 which 
reports the Spearman correlation ranks for selected pairs of technical characteristics.  
 
[Insert Table 2 approximately here] 
 
As expected, the coefficient signs indicate that trade-off existed only for certain 
characteristics (notably road speed and armour, road speed and calibre). The trade-offs 
became particularly important during the 1940-45 time period when countries tried 
harder to tackle them. Coefficients show that certain countries, notably Germany, 
succeeded in solving the trade-offs better than others (USA). Armament calibre and 
armour thickness are positive correlated. This result confirms that pursuing greater fire 
power and looking for better protection occurred in parallel and became relevant during 
WWII when the armament race intensified. All in all, the size of the coefficients suggests 
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implementation. Next section aims at gaining a better understanding of the reasons 
underlying these differences.  
 
4.2. The principal component analysis 
Following Saviotti and Trickett (1992), we use principal component analysis to study the 
distribution of technological characteristics in our population of tank models. Principal 
component analysis is a widely used method of data reduction. When it is applied to an 
original set of variables, it creates a new set of variables that are correlated with the initial 
ones and that explain a reasonably high percentage of the variance existing in the sample. 
In this way, the behaviour of the initial set of variables may be usefully summarized by 
the behaviour of the principal components. Table 3 and Table 4 report the results of our 
principal component analysis.  
 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 approximately here] 
 
The initial set of variables comprises: weight, road speed, range, engine power, armour, 
and armament calibre. Other important variables (i.e. width, hull length, height, type of 
fuel, type of suspensions, armour slope, etc.) were not included because they were not 
available for a sufficient number of models. Historical studies have pointed to the critical 
role of other characteristics, such as reliability or component standardization, in affecting 




Eigenvalues are shown in Table 3. The so-called Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) suggests 
retaining only those principal components with eigenvalue greater than 1. Accordingly, in 
our analysis we limit ourselves to consider the first two principal components. Table 4 
reports the eigenvectors of the components. The eigenvectors are the weights of each 
initial variable for each principal component (each principal component is a linear 
combination of the initial set of variables). It is worth noting that we have considered in 
our analysis only tanks produced in more than 5 exemplars, as a way to limit the 
influence of outliers and experimental designs in our reconstruction of the patterns of 
                                                 
4 Indeed, when this larger set of characteristics is taken into account, the assessment of the relative 
performance of tanks designs becomes much more difficult and debatable. See, for instance, the discussion 
contained in Johnson II et al. (2000). 
 13technical change. However, we have computed the values of the principal components 
also for models produced in less than five exemplars, in order to see their position with 
respect to the core of our technological population.  
 
Table 3 shows that the first two principal components account for more than 80% of the 
total variance. Our first principal component (PC1) contains high contributions from 
weight, engine power, armour and armament calibre, whereas road speed and range 
contribute less. Our second principal component (PC2) is characterized by strong 
contributions of road speed and range and by small or even negative contributions from 
the other variables. In terms of interpretation, PC1 may be clearly understood as an 
indicator of the overall battlefield capability of the tank (in particular PC1 may be viewed 
as a synthetic indicator of fire-power and protection), whereas PC2 appears as an 
indicator of mobility. It should be noted that the results of the principal component 
analysis are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of other variables in the initial set of 
variables analysed. 
 
The estimated principal components can be used to evaluate the relative merits of 
alternative tank designs. Figures 4 (A, B, C, D) represent the distribution of our tank 
population in terms of principal components in various sub-periods. Superior designs are 
located farther in the North-East region of the principal component space.  
 
[Insert Figures 4 (A, B, C, D) approximately here] 
 
A similar cross-country pattern seems to emerge. In the early period 1915-1920, tank 
designs are concentrated in the South-West region and display negative values of both 
PC1 (battlefield capability) and PC2 (mobility). In the period 1921-1930 there is a 
movement towards the right, which can be interpreted as an attempt to improve the 
mobility of the tank. In the period 1931-1939, tank designs are mostly clustered on a 
diagonal around quadrant II and IV of the principal components space.
5 Finally in the 
final period, 1940-1945, we see the cloud of designs moving in a North East direction, 
with several tank models characterized by positive values of both PC1 and PC2.
6 It is 
                                                 
5 The few tank models in this period that are able to ‘score’ positive value of both PC1and PC2 are Soviet 
tank models.   
6 Among these models we find some of the most successful tanks such as the Russian T-34 and the 
German Panther, together with the British Cromwell which is not usually regarded as particularly effective 
design because of the lack of slope armour, a feature not considered in our principal component analysis. 
 14interesting to see that some experimental ‘super-heavy’ tank models such as the German 
Maus and E-100 as well as the American T-28 are located far away from the region which 
contains the majority of tank designs. These models clearly represent ‘aberrations’ with 
respect to the normal pattern of technical progress.
7   
 
As we have noted in the previous section, it would be misleading to limit the 
consideration of the effectiveness of various tank models only to the evaluation of 
technical characteristics. During WWII, being able to mass produce tanks was, from a 
strategic viewpoint, at least as important as improving their quality. Table 3 contains the 
quantities and the principal component values of the main tank models used during the 
war.  
 
[Insert Table 3 approximately here] 
 
While good designs could not always be easily mass produced, in some case (notably the 
T-34 and the M-4 Sherman model), this was indeed possible.  
 
4.3. Mapping the technological trajectory 
The results of our principal component analysis provide insights into the nature of the 
search process that underlay the evolution of tank technology. Consistently with the 
paradigm/trajectory approach, our finding suggests that inventive activities were selective 
and finalised in rather precise directions. Figure 5 maps the unfolding of the 
technological trajectory in our space of Principal Components, by means of subsequent 
“Standard Deviational Ellipses” (SDE).  
 
[Insert Figure 5 approximately here] 
 
The construction of SDE is a technique for analysing dispersion in point patterns in two-
dimensional spaces (see, Ebdon, 1977: 112-119, for a detailed overview). SDE are fitted 
by calculating: the centre of the ellipsis, the orientation, and the length of the shortest 
and longest axes, which are always orthogonal to each other. Specifically, the centre of 
                                                 
7 Indeed, in the case of Germany, the presence of such ‘aberrations’ is revealing of a general approach to 
tank design based on the idea of constructing the “miracle tank” (i.e. a tank endowed with unparallel 
armour and armament). The Tiger may be considered as a rather successful outcome of this approach (see 
Johnson II et al., 2004: 247)  
 15the ellipsis is simply the mean centre of the point pattern, the orientation is given by the 
calculation of the direction of maximum dispersion, and the length of the two main axes 
reflect the dispersion of the points around the centre along those dimensions. For each 
sub-period of our sample, we construct one SDE. The arrows connecting the centres of 
two subsequent ellipses provide a synthetic representation of design shifts and describe 
the unfolding of the trajectory. This technique seems to provide a rigorous 
implementation of the idea of representing the path of evolution of a product population 
through aptly defined clusters of points as proposed by Saviotti (1996: 67-70).  
 
Between the first and the second period, the ellipsis shifts horizontally suggesting that 
there is an attempt at improving the mobility of the tank, somewhat neglecting the 
battlefield capability. Between the second and the third period, efforts to improve 
battlefield capability were carried out, without sacrificing too much on mobility. This led 
to a cluster of tank models stretched diagonally along region II and IV in the principal 
components space. The stretching of the cluster can also be interpreted as a process of 
specialization of tank designs. In this sense, countries dealt with engineering trade-offs 
not only by means of design improvements but also by producing models with different 
capabilities. This is the main motivation for the emergence of the differentiation between 
‘light’, ‘medium’ and ‘heavy’ tanks. Between the third and the fourth period (i.e. during 
WWII) we see a further shift toward the North East area of the graph with some 
particular successful models capable of scoring good combinations in both mobility and 
battlefield capability. Not surprisingly, the war seems to have induced an acceleration of 
technical change. This development is not only related to the increase in the resources 
invested in development of new designs, but also to the feedback generated by the actual 
use of tanks on the battlefield (as well as to the reverse engineering on captured enemy 
models). 
 
By looking at Figures 4 and 5 together, another interesting finding emerges. Although 
there were particularly successful designs, there was also a rather high degree of closeness 
and even overlap between tanks produced in different countries. In this sense, no 
country seems to have ever gained a sizable and sustained technological leadership. This 
result contrasts with widespread beliefs in the superiority of German tanks that circulated 
in many Allied military circles in the initial phases of WWII. In the North African front, 
this belief even led to the formulation of a rule of thumb which stated that in order to 
 16approach combat with some victory chances, British tanks ought to have a numerical 
superiority of at least 3 to 2 (Griffith, 1990: 74). As suggested by several historians (see 
Harris, 1995 and the essays collected in Harris and Toase, 1990), the successes achieved 
by German tanks in the first years of the war were due more to their effective use on the 
battlefield than to an intrinsic technological superiority. The same holds true for the 
Soviet achievements after 1942.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
This paper has taken an empirical stance to study the notion of technological trajectories. 
By looking at the evolution of tank technology between 1915 and 1945 principal 
component analysis and Standard Deviational Ellipses techniques have been used to 
analyze the distribution of technological characteristics and to map them into specific 
service characteristics. Despite the existence of differences in technical leadership across 
countries, we have found the presence of a high degree of overlap among the tanks 
designs of different countries and we were able to identify a common technological 
trajectory. 
 
These results raise a series of issues related to the application of the paradigm/trajectory 
view in empirical studies of technology evolution. The first issue concerns the interaction 
between different types of knowledge that shapes the trajectory. Dosi’s notion of 
paradigm is essentially restricted to a community of technological practitioners. However, 
in the case of tanks, doctrinal aspects (i.e. the theory of ‘blitzkrieg’ developed by 
Guderian and the analogous concept of ‘deep battle’ due to the Russian Tukhachevskii) 
mattered for the development of the technology.
8 Indeed, the case of tanks has suggested 
that at least two communities were interacting and potentially shaping the evolution of 
the trajectory. The first is the community of engineers involved in design activities. The 
second is the community of military establishments and strategists engaged in the 
formulation of the ‘principles’ on how tanks were to be used in the battlefield. 
Interestingly enough, historians have so far devoted most of the attention to the 
paradigmatic discussion taking place within this second community. In particular, several 
contributions have focussed on the one hand, on the failures of ‘innovative thinkers’ 
such as J.F.C. Fuller and Liddell Hart in transforming the views of the British military 
                                                 
8 Following the execution of Tukhachevskii in the 1930s, the concept of ‘deep battle’ was rejected from 
high command of the Red Army. However, after the initial dramatic defeats Soviet military establishments 
quickly returned on their footsteps.   
 17establishment on the role of tanks in future wars,
 9 and, on the other hand, on the 
successes of Guderian and Tukhachevskii in developing successful principles of tank 
operation in Germany and the Soviet Union. To date, instead, there has not been much 
research devoted to the engineering community.  
 
In this respect, there are two particular important implications for scholars interested in 
the application of the paradigm/trajectory approach to the history of technology. The 
first, which is in line with current developments, is that due attention must be paid to 
users and the communities in charge of prescribing the ‘code of use’ of a specific 
technology. In most cases, this means that it may be necessary to adopt broad narrative 
frames spanning beyond the study of the activities of the community of technological 
practitioners (Edgerton, 1999; Staudenmaier, 2002). The second point is that quantitative 
studies such as the present one can help in shedding light on the role played by various 
communities in shaping technical progress along specific directions. Our reconstruction 
reveals that the pattern of technical change in tank technology in the period 1915-1945 
was broadly similar in all the countries we are considering. This clearly points to a 
relatively minor influence of doctrinal debates on actual tank designs, although not on 
their use on the battlefield.  
 
The second issue is methodological. This paper has shown that technological trajectories 
can be studied by using data on the technical characteristics of artefacts. A number of 
recent studies (Mina et al., 2004; Verspagen, 2005) have attempted to map technological 
trajectories using patent data. These contributions reconstruct the knowledge flows 
underlying the development of specific technologies. Indeed, knowledge can be regarded 
as a further space in which the dynamics of technical change takes place. In this sense, 
this approach is complementary to the mapping exercises on technological and service 
characteristics carried out in this paper. Providing quantitatively-based accounts of 
technological change which integrates the knowledge, technological and service 
characteristics space is the challenging research agenda for the future.  
 
                                                 
9 The following statement by Sir Douglass Haig (commander of one of the two armies of the British force 
on the continent during WWI and one of the most enthusiastic supporter of mechanized warfare) in 1925 
is revealing of the degree of doctrinal conservatism existing among British high command: “I believe that 
the value of the horse and the opportunity for the horse in the future are likely to be as great as ever...I am 
all for using aeroplanes and tanks, but they are only accessories to the man and the horse, and I feel sure 
that as time goes on you will find just as much use for the horse – the well-bred horse - as you have ever 
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF TANK MODELS BY COUNTRY AND TIME PERIODS  
  1915-1920 1921-1930 1931-1939 1940-1945 TOT 
FRANCE  7 6 17  1 31 
GERMANY 5  1  21  31  58 
USSR -  3  16  13  32 
UK  14 22 20 20 76 
USA  7  10 19 29 65 
TOT  33 42 93 94 262 
 
TABLE  2:  SPEARMAN’S  CORRELATION RANK FOR SELECTED TECHNICAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
 A RMOUR / CALIBRE 
  15-45  15-20 21-30  31-39 40-45 
GERMANY .52***  .33  nc  .54**  .75*** 
USSR .84***  --  nc  .68**  .86*** 
UK .50*** nc  .01  -.25  .57** 
USA .79***  .27  .84***  nc  .81*** 
FRANCE .26  .26  .72  .50*  -- 
 R OAD SPEED / ARMOUR 
  15-45  15-20 21-30  31-39 40-45 
GERMANY .17  -.41  nc  .07  -.45** 
USSR -.16  --  .87  -.37  -.14 
UK -.01  .01  .31  -.57**  -.33 
USA .22*  .41  -.36  -.25  -.74*** 
FRANCE .06  .58  .50  -.54**  - 
 R OAD SPEED / CALIBRE 
  15-45  15-20 21-30  31-39 40-45 
GERMANY -.36**  -.82  nc  -.60**  -.44** 
USSR -.14  --  .87  -.61**  -.47 
UK -.20  nc  -.29  -.05  -.18 
USA .11  .50  -.41  nc  -.65*** 
FRANCE  -.24 .08 .77  .26 -- 
*** Denotes significance at 99% level, ** Denotes significance at 95% level, * Denotes 
significance at 90% level;  -- No observations;  nc Not computable 
 21TABLE 3A: PCA EIGENVALUES  






1 3.20770  .5346  .5346 
2 1.66435  .2774  .8120 
3 .44653  .0744  .8894 
4 .38503  .0642  .9506 
5 .22831  .0381  .9887 
6 .06810  .0113  1.0000 
 
TABLE 3B: PCA EIGENVECTORS 
VARIABLE  1 2 3 4 5 6 
WEIGHT  .49054  -.25753 -.26251 -.29893 .31759  .65872 
ROAD SPEED  .15168 .67293 -.37872  -49054 -.19883  .31744 
RANGE  .14781 .66038 .49207 -.41918  .35207 -.01576 
ENGINE POWER  .52002 .03143 -.41209  .04364 .32049 -.67391 
ARMOUR  .50272 .00358 .13094 -.32113  -.78702  -.08706 
CALIBRE  .43746 -.20914  .59880 .62392 .11714 .05776 
Components with eigenvalues <1 account for less variance of the original variables (usually 
choice is eigenvalue> 1)  
 
 22TABLE 4: NUMBER OF MANUFACTURED TANKS BY COUNTRY AND PC VALUES (SELECTED 
MODELS) 
COUNTRY T ANK NAME Y EAR Q UANTITY PC1  PC2 
PANZERKAMPFWAGEN 
3 
1941 5728  .1240436  .1399211 
PANZERKAMPFWAGEN 
4 
1943 11900  .8720915  .2788949 
PANZERKAMPFWAGEN 
5 - PANTHER 
1942 6000  2.936454  .1894711 
PANZERKAMPFWAGEN 
6 - TIGER 
1942 1355  3.481624  -1.284722 
GERMANY 
PANZERKAMPFWAGEN 
6 - TIGER 2 
1944 485  4.855554  -1.105824 
T-34/76 1940  34000  1.805007  1.390257 
KV-1 1940  9200  2.496946  -.0170016 
KV-2 1940  330  3.964606  -1.477566 
T-60 1941  12584  -1.194056  4.279655 
T-40 1941  230  -1.676493  2.247915 
T-70 1942  8226  -.4021318  2.986667 
T-34/85 1943  18000  2.24252  1.2318 
T-44 1944  965  2.8654  .7024316 
JS-1/2 1944  7600  3.24815  -.9179595 
USSR 
JS-3 1945  2311  3.475639  -.943263 
CRUISER  MK  5 
(COVENANTER) 
1940 1700  -.768018  .8314859 
CRUISER  MK  6 
(CRUSADER) 
1940 5300  -.0259859  1.779674 
VALENTINE TANK 1940  8275  -.3075766  -1.091966 
CRUISER  MK  7 
(CAVALIER) 
1941 500  .4600362  1.21691 
CRUISER  MK  8 
(CENTAUR) 
1941 950  .5362918  1.380761 
CHURCHILL  TANKS 
(A20-A22) 
1941 6268  2.199254  -1.282677 
CRUISER  MK  8 
(CROMWELL) 
1943 4200  2.487875  1.886112 
UK 
CHALLENGER (A30) 1943  200  2.185204  .2403112 
M2A4 LIGHT 1940  365 -1.116781  .0215736 
M3 LIGHT (STUART) 1941  13859  -.7091648 .7521166 
M3 MEDIUM 1941  7200  .8212128  .1771654 
M5 LIGHT (STUART) 1942  8884  -.3718613 1.124284 
M22 LIGHT (LOCUST) 1941  830  -1.193274  1.290847 
M4  MEDIUM 
(SHERMAN) 
1942 58000  1.289687  -.0015623 
M6 HEAVY 1942  40  2.761417  -.5967936 
M24 LIGHT (CHAFFEE) 1943  4731  -.0422105  .3376803 
USA 
M26  MEDIUM 
(PERSHING) 
1944 1400  2.568808  -.0106361 
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